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Introduction
The technical society that came into being in the th century and became the
flourishing industrial society of the th century introduced a series of new con-
ditions into the field of image and sound. These conditions influenced firstly the
effects that were sought and produced. There was a move both to record and
reproduce reality as exactly as possible and, on the contrary, to create the fantas-
tic and embody fantasy. There was the portrayal of such phenomena as move-
ment, succession and the flow of time. Secondly, and more significantly, the new
conditions had an impact on the means used, in other words, the devices and
machines.
The mechanical model, which began with Descartes and de la Mettrie, over-
turned Aristotle’s physics and opened up a new conceptual space that gave rise
to a series of propositions concerning the modes of apprehension of both objects
and beings, with in particular the division into discrete units, which could then
be combined. This conceptual space allowed for the body’s mobilising power
and dynamics to be located outside of it. The importance of the paradigm of the
clock in the seventeenth century is well known – the clock with its weights and
the spring-driven watch were micro-mechanisms that inaugurated a new state
that combined two types of movements and stop mechanisms to achieve regu-
larity; its effect is to transform movement into information. One might speak of
a ‘clock-making’ episteme spreading implicit or stated knowledge in various
ways, in various sectors of knowledge, ideas, practices and institutions, knowl-
edge based on dissociation, assembling, articulation, automatism, etc. (the clock
or watchmaker was a central character in the th century together with clocks
and also automata, right up to Méliès’s Robert-Houdin theatre).
We speak here of episteme. The term, coined by Michel Foucault, is proble-
matic, partly because of the way it ‘competes’ in this chapter with the notions
of ‘model’ and ‘paradigm’ with which it is often confused. Foucault’s episteme
has a characteristic which distinguishes it from the paradigm (described by Tho-
mas S. Kuhn) and a fortiori from the model, in that it does not define a state of
knowledge – whether scientific or philosophical – at a particular moment, but
that which makes a theory, practice or opinion possible.
Thus, one can say that the representation of the ‘mechanical era’ was ‘fitted
out with tools’, ‘engineered’, and no longer used its own techniques (those of the
painter or sculptor, their savoir-faire) but, instead, used instruments and techni-
ques designed for other ends. This ‘equipment’ of the processes of representa-
tion represents one of the transformations of this period, which was charac-
terised by the promotion of (existing) apparatuses from the status of instrument
to that of machine (Dürer employed apparatuses, as did the perspecteurs, but they
were controlled by their own hands). It is true that Bazin saw this move to
automatism as the dispossession of man as creator, but he immediately brought
back Providence into the liberated space: the photographic imprint is the Veil of
Veronica, but there is no longer an intermediary (it is the artist’s ‘temperament’
that is interposed as a prism in Zola’s famous expression that is referred to
here). Bazin, contrary to Walter Benjamin, believed that one should do without
the apparatus because Veronica’s Veil is not the screen, it receives its imprint
using neither lens nor exposure time, nor development, printing, calibration,
etc. (and yet when Niepce took his first photograph, he was immediately sub-
jected to the weight of the technical dispositive of his machine with its two
shadows – already the very ‘first’ landscape is not an imprint in Bazin’s use of
the word: it records several time-periods because of the very nature of the ma-
chine).
When Canaletto introduced his Camera Obscura in Venice’s piazze and, as it
were, ‘fixed’ the landscapes, he was taking part in this automatism; when he
combined different images, added a campanile taken from elsewhere, moved a
church or a palace, it was because he was able to conceive of the process of
dissociating and reassembling a view on the basis of presuppositions that were
not based on those of El Greco, who ‘turned’ a building around in his painting
of the Toledo landscape. And a fortiori the photographer Gustave Le Gray, who
‘mounted’ his images from several negatives.
The introduction of this equipment led to a new type of relation between ob-
ject, apparatus, representation and spectator, which was to take concrete form
at a certain moment in the dispositives of viewing and listening (i.e., an organisa-
tion that assigns positions to its protagonists) – the cinematograph, photograph,
television, phonograph, telephone, etc., each of which assumed various struc-
tures and shapes. By examining the conditions of possibility of these disposi-
tives, we shall construct what we call the  episteme. Thanks to this analysis
of the epistemology of dispositives, we shall be in a position to entirely restruc-
ture the field of modes of representation, including traditional media such as
painting or literature.
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Dispositives and machines: hypotheses
Other scholars have envisaged these dispositives and machines. From our point
of view, however, none of their approaches is satisfactory. We are referring here
firstly to the vision of the s, when scholars such as Jean-Louis Baudry and
Jean-Pierre Oudart concentrated on the cinematograph, which was only exam-
ined from the point of view of the perceiving subject with a Lacanian perspec-
tive. Secondly, there is Friedrich Kittler’s transferring of the Lacanian triad (ima-
ginary, symbolic, real) onto that of the gramophone, cinema and typewriter, and
thirdly Jonathan Crary’s analysis which, despite its Foucauldian premise, not
only fails to address the relation between concrete ‘machinic’dispositives and the
discourses he analyses, but also changes direction by fixing on the stereoscope
as the place of rupture and emergence of a phenomenological model of the sub-
ject. Crary sees the introduction of subjectivity with time and duration, and fo-
cuses on the subject rather than analysing the construction of the subject via the
dispositive (for Michel Foucault, there is no (phenomenological) subject, but
discursive dispositives which assign a place to the subject and constitute it as
such – ‘the dispositive is above all a machine which produces subjectivations’).
Our hypothesis is therefore that the new conditions of viewing and listening
that emerged out of industrial society have redrawn the spectator-spectacle
schema by introducing the question of the dispositive, which assigns a new posi-
tion to those who view. This can be seen not only in the introduction of ma-
chines and tools that increase vision (from the telescope to the magic lantern),
and recording or capturing devices (photography, the gramophone), but also in
the promotion-spectacle of the manufactured object, its exhibition (as Philippe
Hamon has shown when writing about universal exhibitions), traffic condi-
tions (speed) and urban relations (shocks), as well as in the commentaries that
highlight such phenomena.
There is no shortage of examples of this ‘regulation’ by these apparatuses and
machines, which belong to a whole series of fields to which they were pre-
viously not connected – the regulation or domination proceeding from the Präg-
nanz of their modes of functioning. Félix Fénéon wrote about the shadow thea-
tre in  as follows:
M. Henry Rivière has civilised the previously rudimentary art of the shadow theatre.
Before him, the shadows filed past like characters on friezes or ‘Paronies’. When he
had to engineer M. Caran d’Ache’s Epopée, he positioned them with an effect of per-
spective at ever-greater distances, and thought up masterly and instantaneous tricks
to have the groups of characters advance and then disappear. Granted, the screen still
only showed black silhouettes, but at least it was no longer a naïve surface, and
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achieved depth. And now there is decisive progress with the addition of every colour
– in forty minutes, forty tableaus hold their own.
Emile Verhaeren commented similarly on Claude Monet’s works – the pictorial
reality – via Marey’s chronophotographic machine. As it was the representation
of a landscape, he evoked its ‘successive aspects, arrested in flight by an eye of
extraordinary acuity’. Monet’s eye becomes the photographic gun, it captures
objects in mid-air, including objects that are not necessarily birds. As Whistler
wrote to Fantin-Latour in : ‘You catch it [the instant] in flight just as you kill
a bird in the air’.
These are some examples of machinic elements that make up the dispositive
before the advent of the cinema, and that the epistemic schema allows us to for-
mulate, avoiding the content-based, teleological approach which would have
Fénéon ‘anticipate’ the successive images of the cinematograph in Rivière’s
shadow theatre, or Verhaeren and Whistler be ‘under the influence’ of or in-
spired by chronophotography. The question is of another order, and indeed re-
fers to that ‘implicit knowledge’ that makes such statements possible.
The question thus becomes: what did one call ‘recreated movement’ in the
nineteenth century before the appearance of the kinetoscope and the cinemato-
graph, and afterwards? This may seem to be a somewhat unrefined variable, but
the answer is by no means a straightforward one.
The notion of movement, or even that of breaking out of the framework of the
representation, was something that could be effectively realised before the ac-
tual production of movement by the machine or the effect of movement by
means of optical illusion. The enraptured critic, standing in front of one of Gus-
tave Le Gray’s photographs, ‘the Great Wave’ (), wrote that the spectator
standing in front of the image was subjugated by its exactness and its rendering,
‘and would be tempted to step backward in order not to be touched by its fur-
ious momentum’. When discussing such a reaction, one can, of course, take
into account the literary garrulousness of the critic. This is, after all, what he
wrote after the event, and he was not actually caught in the act of backing away
in the manner of the first spectators at the Grand Café reacting in front of the
irruption of the locomotive. But the fact remains that the critic cannot describe
such a reaction without a certain agreement, without it being acceptable to read-
ers (irrespective of whether they have seen the photograph). It should, more-
over, be noted that like Le Gray, the Lumière brothers set out to ‘fix’ the move-
ment of waves which, like that of smoke, wind rustling leaves, waterfalls, etc.,
produces a greater effect than that of people parading past, like in the shadow
theatre. The notion of effect is a crucial one for certain photographers and, to a
large extent, addresses the relation between the representation and the specta-
tor. Le Gray enters into some detail on the question in his treatise of .
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Movement can be inferred from effect if the effect fixes something moving with
particular force (as is the case for a wave).
This notion of effect also allows us to understand how black-and-white photo-
graphy in  could belong to the problematic of the colourist painters, who
broke with the supremacy of drawing in favour of work on the ‘economy of
light’, contours, nuances of the same colour, or mass processing which alone
suited colour, as Baudelaire wrote in his Salon of  (‘III. On Colour’).
Such agreement in the type of reactions aroused by a representation can
doubtless be explained by the change brought about by photography when
compared to a pictorial representation, leading to a phenomenon of ‘absorbment’
(the meaning being a little different from Michael Fried’s ‘absorption’), several
examples of which were given by Diderot in his descriptions (he constructed a
narrative which involved penetrating inside the picture and navigating within it
– and even losing oneself inside it). The photographic paradigm thus becomes
the interpretant of the different visual phenomena.
In Le Gray’s work, this effect of breaking out produced the dissociation of the
two planes (the sea and the sky), even if the dissociation is not literally enacted
but ‘faked’. Since the two elements are not continuous, they produce the dehis-
cence which sees the bottom threatening to detach itself from the top because
the respective precision of their execution makes them dissociable, in a manner
of speaking. The acknowledged influence of the panorama model on Le Gray
can be seen here, where two or three horizontal zones were superposed – the
sky, the sea and the shore, where nothing limited them on the sides. Here we are
in a ‘machine’ (with faking by means of two juxtaposed negatives) and a dispo-
sitive (the spectator is invited to discover an effect of precision that exceeds the
codes that are in force and is thus brought to a ‘new vision’ of a phenomenon
that was nevertheless well known and represented).
Thus, we see that photography adopted something of the dispositive of the
panorama, before painting borrowed it from photography in the works of
Whistler, Courbet, Manet and Boudin. As Walter Benjamin wrote, Le Gray’s
wave spread in painting, where Courbet in particular won the reputation of
having fixed an instantaneous snapshot.
Research aims
We have decided neither to espouse the approaches of the s, nor to follow
in the footsteps of such scholars as Crary – whose example, despite our re-
serves, is an interesting one – but to examine the cinematographic dispositive.
For the purposes of our demonstration, it has been reduced here to the ‘view-
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ing’dispositive alone, implying that the ‘listening’dispositive still has to be con-
structed. Our aim is thus to describe and apprehend this dispositive:
. as an epistemic schema (definition);
. as belonging to a network, a wider epistemic configuration (that of cine-
matics, of Marey’s physiology of movement, which breaks down both animal
and human movement into different phases; or that of social practices, such
as being in a train with the spectacularisation of the landscape, bringing to-
gether an immobile spectator, a mobile spectacle and a framework of vision)
(inclusion);
. as providing a model – a paradigm – not only within the restricted field of
viewing dispositives, but going beyond it to the broader field of visuality (i.
e., painting and literature), and even to that of thought (the ‘cinema’, a model
of knowledge according to Bergson, a model of the psychic apparatus for
some psychologists or psychoanalysts) (extension).
To develop these three points:
. What is an epistemic schema in the context of our research? A formation or
epistemic schema defines the formalisation of a series of viewing dispositives
– to be understood as machines/discourses/practices – that we must con-
struct.
. Once the schema is made explicit as a network of relations, that it has the
status of a theoretical object, singular dispositives appear as empirical singu-
lar actualisations of this schema.
. The schema that brings together all the elements associated with the cinema-
tographic dispositives will be the ‘cinema’ schema, it being understood that
the term does not match cinema seen as an empirical object.
Our definition of the viewing dispositive is sufficiently broad to enable us to
open up to research beyond any particular singular historical variation of the
cinematographic dispositive. We consider that a viewing dispositive formalises
the links between spectator, machinery and representation. By machinery we
mean not only the viewing machine as a technical object (for example, the pro-
jection apparatus) but also all the elements used to show (in the wider sense of
the term): for example the screen, the mirror of the phenakistoscope, photo-
grams, the chemical process of photography.
The epistemic schema brings together two distinct levels in its definition: the
specification of the concrete elements of the various dispositives, and the concepts
that are linked to them – for example, the notions of the breaking down of
movement, temporal immediacy or deferred broadcasting.
We believe that in order to construct such a schema, it is vital to bring to-
gether several approaches, which we can summarise as follows: a) the study of
30 François Albera and Maria Tortajada
discourses, b) the study of concrete dispositives, even if this is too simplistic a
formalisation, as in both cases discourses may allow knowledge (savoir) to be
constructed, and c) the study of institutional and social practices that are both
engaged by, and that engage, these dispositives. The first two will be developed
further.
Studies of discourses
An epistemological perspective will be taken to study the different discourses,
and to distinguish the various spaces of enunciation:
. the scientific discourses of inventors, engineers and popularisers;
. the technical (prescriptive) discourses of technicians, salesmen, etc.;
. the discourses of users (spectators, event managers) considered within their
institutional framework (implying hierarchies, legitimating discourses,
power relations, etc.);
. literary discourses that produce variations of the dispositive within an ima-
ginary world (Verne, Villiers de l’Isle Adam, Jarry, Apollinaire, Roussel);
. discourses of the spectacular (magic and conjuring, i.e. Méliès).
We aim to identify the different viewing dispositives in these discourses, what-
ever their nature (and not only those dealing with cinematography in the strict
sense of the term) and thus pinpoint the constituents of the epistemic schema to
which cinema in its various forms contributes as a singular historical disposi-
tive.
We shall, moreover, not only set out to identify the various constituents of the
dispositive such as they are evinced in these discourses, but also pinpoint the
different variations, extensions and links that are established within the differ-
ent discourses between such elements of the dispositive and other fields of
knowledge or practices.
Finally, we shall determine the place given to each visual dispositive in each
discourse. This will, for example, entail defining the function given to the parti-
cular dispositive. Is it a tool, a model of thought or the actual object of study?
Various examples of this kind of investigation can be envisaged – two aspects
are presented in the brief account that follows: ) What does a particular dis-
course retain of the viewing dispositive that it establishes? ) What function
does it give to this/these dispositive(s) in its discourse?
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Marey
Marey approached the different viewing dispositives that he used or developed
(from the graphic notation method to chronophotography) by starting from his
interest in locomotion. His aim was to note, break down and transcribe animal
and human movement in discrete units. He was absolutely unconcerned with
perception, which, in fact, he avoided because it did not capture the relevant
articulations.
The zoetrope and chronophotography provided him with a means of check-
ing and fine-tuning his notations. The increase in phases and greater fragmenta-
tion were a result of the sought-after correspondence between phenomena and
notations.
– For him, the dispositive was defined by the cinematic traits of the observed
phenomenon, and its transcription was grounded in the framework of phy-
siology.
– The dispositive was the model of the object that he was analysing (he high-
lighted the relevant characteristics).
However, research into the correspondence between the phases of the phenom-
enon and the instants that were chosen was complicated by the quest for a scale
of temporal notation based on the regularity of the intervals. When the chosen
moments correspond to the intervals of the clock, what is noted is simply any –
and not only remarkable – instants: ‘photograms’ break down the movement
without considering the relevance of the cuts.
Moreover, this cutting up is verified by the reconstitution of the movement,
which is apparent during projection and adjusted according to the perception of
the spectator.
– The logic of the apparatus – i.e., its functioning – supplants the logic of the
phenomenon under analysis, thus the visual dispositive is defined in other
terms.
When Marey adopted a vector of regularity (i.e., equidistant intervals) that is
outside the actual phenomenon, he was brought back to perception, and thus
to illusion.
– It thus became necessary to develop a third phase – manipulating the projec-
tion apparatus, which can be slowed down, speeded up or stopped to come
back to analysing movement in scientific terms. These characteristics of the
‘cinema’dispositive, which Marey systematized, would in part be integrated
into the cinema as entertainment (reversion, slow motion, and accelerated
motion as attractions for the Lumière brothers), and then scientific cinema
(the growth of flowers, etc.).
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Bergson
Marey’s chronophotography was a viewing dispositive that played a key role
for Bergson, as the dispositive determined the viewpoint he was to develop: he
aimed to go beyond it in the name of higher knowledge. In the context of philo-
sophical discourse, Bergson referred to a variety of viewing dispositives – for
example, the photograph, ‘already taken, already developed’, that he used to
model ‘pure perception, and the ‘discernment’ that it implies; or the process of
photographic focusing, which refers to the activity of the memory.
He used the reference to cinema by considering certain of its aspects – the
mechanical element, the photogrammatic, the phenomenon of the breaking
down of movement and its recomposition. He was thus particularly interested
in the machinery, rather than the representational side. It was a dispositive that
was part of the project that Bergson developed, his aim being to criticise the
analytical process of science – and it gave him a model of the functioning of
scientific thought. It was thus a central pillar of Bergson’s discourse, and became
not only the illustration of a historical phenomenon, but also a model, in essence
a concrete epistemic schema that was proper to the complex philosophical sys-
tem that he elaborated. That, of course, does not mean that this model of the
cinema corresponds to the epistemic schema that we wish to construct, but it is
interesting to note that in the historical context of , the viewing dispositive
in question acquired this status. The epistemic schema to be constructed will
have to take this aspect into account.
Jarry
Alfred Jarry takes us into the world of literary discourse which in no way claims
to constitute a type of knowledge (connaissance), and yet which invents a type of
knowledge (savoir) via the imaginary world that it develops. Thus, through Jar-
ry’s various fictions, we can construct a criticism of Bergson’s theory on the ex-
perience of movement as continuity, thanks, in particular, to reference to the
cinematographic dispositive.
The cinematographic dispositive is formulated in a variety of ways in Jarry’s
work, which distance it from the historical model that spectators at the turn of
the century were familiar with. He exploited the machine, the series of photo-
grams, the projector’s and cine-camera’s rotating movements, and the impact of
speed.
Above all, Jarry breaks up the different fields of knowledge and experience
by pitting them against each other, mixing them together and playing with
paradox. He exploits the various machines of the modern world – trains, auto-
mobiles and cycles of all types are present, whether in his plays, novels or news-
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paper articles. The imaginary variations on the cinematographic dispositive
come face to face with other viewing dispositives, such as photography, as is
the case in some of the texts in la Chandelle verte. But there are also other scien-
tific fields – in le Surmâle (The Supermale), Jarry stages a combat between two
giants, one embodying kinematics via the cinematograph, the other electricity
via the dynamo. Between the lines, one can spot the traces of the conceptual
battle being fought out between the two key domains of physics – mechanics
and electromagnetism – which went through a serious crisis at the end of the
th century, that would ultimately be resolved by Einstein’s discoveries of re-
stricted relativity.
Jarry tested both philosophical and scientific concepts in his literary writings
and by means of inventing machines – ‘his’ cinematograph being one of the
most important ones. His proposals concerning viewing dispositives enter into
the extended epistemic schema that we seek to construct, and allow us to gauge
his capacity of defining a certain ‘modernity’.
Apollinaire
Apollinaire’s interest in the cinema is regularly evoked by scholars who mention
the column about films that he started writing in the s in les Soirées de Paris,
and the rolls of film that are kept at the Bibliothèque Nationale. They also note
that he composed a script – la Bréhatine – that was ‘not meant for filming’ – as
Benjamin Fondane later pointed out in defining a ‘genre’ that was popular with
the Dadaists and Surrealists. Like his contemporary, the humorist Cami, Apolli-
naire parodied cinema’s action-packed stories. Scholars also mention the inter-
view he gave to SIC in  and his lecture at the Theatre du Vieux Colombier in
, where he extolled the virtues of ‘art nouveau’, ‘popular art par excellence’.
But nowhere is mention made of the story entitled ‘le Roi-Lune’ (the ‘Moon
King’), which was published at the same time in the Mercure de France. He
used machines that combined some of the characteristics of the cinematograph
and the phonograph. These included recording and the ability to reproduce a
sound or image taken, and thus furnished the possibility of re-living a past
event, creating the illusion of reality, etc. He thus developed two aspects which
anticipated the future to come: virtuality and simultaneity. Firstly, the filming of
improbable images of people living in the past (i.e., great inamorata) caught in
improbable situations (sexual pleasure, for example) produces a simulated ac-
tivity that is really experienced (moving from simulacra to simulation). Sec-
ondly, communication via a microphone with the whole of the planet from a
centre point (thanks to the telegraphic wire, which takes the place of the radio
waves that will come later) brings about the generalised intercommunication
within the ‘global village’. Apollinaire thus conceived of operations that one
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would now usually relate to the advent of ‘new technologies’ by using ‘old new
technologies’. His narrator describes a box, a kind of apparatus that enables one
to interact with virtual images (‘I could look at, touch, in a word I could plea-
sure … the body within my reach, whereas the body had no idea that I was
there, as it had no present reality’). Moreover, the organ belonging to the Moon
King (Louis II of Bavaria), which is connected by ‘sophisticated microphones …
so as to bring into this underground place the noises coming from the furthest
outposts of terrestrial life’, brings him directly up to date with the murmurs,
fracas, and words from the rest of the world: ‘Now it was the murmurs of a
Japanese landscape … Then … we were transported … Then … we found our-
selves at Papeete market, … now we are in America … It is four o’clock. In Rio
de Janeiro a carnival-like cavalcade goes past … It is six o’clock on Saint-Pierre-
de-la-Martinique … Seven o’clock, Paris’, etc. In other words, we are presented
with an auricular, immobile tour of the world.
Apollinaire thus used some of the characteristics of the cinematographic and
phonographic dispositives and their variables related to viewing or listening
apparatuses that preceded or are contemporary to the cinema. He produced
novel combinations that convey how the imaginary world of the ‘cinema’ in-
cludes functions and faculties that would later be distributed differently (by
specifying that a particular machine would deal with a particular task) accord-
ing to industrial or commercial determinations.
The proposed model for studying concrete dispositives
Apart from these discourses, it is necessary to study not only the concrete func-
tioning of the various viewing dispositives, but also the machines themselves as
material objects, together with the specific dispositives in their historical and
structural dimensions, and finally the social dimension of spectators.
In order to ensure optimum comprehension and description of the different
dispositives, a model has been developed that allows fine distinctions to be
made between the possible visual dispositives. The model is founded on the
three terms that themselves constitute the defining constants of viewing and
listening dispositives – the spectator, the machinery and the representation. It is
important to stress firstly that ‘machinery’ does not simply boil down to the
machine, secondly that the problematics of the theory of representation are in-
cluded in ‘representation’, and thirdly that ‘spectator’ includes the various psy-
chological, sociological and cognitive approaches to the notion. Moreover, the
three levels have to be redefined each time.
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It is a useful model in that it clearly distinguishes between the three levels and
highlights data that are used to develop problematics that could not take shape
if they were simply addressed from the viewpoint of current approaches. Many
authors who have approached these questions anew insert the dispositive into
pre-existing theories, which, more often than not, ends up simply by checking
that the theories function properly rather than actually exploring the character-
istics of the dispositive. The model should, for example, allow one to leave
behind some of the classic oppositions such as the alternative between the spec-
tator’s activity and passivity, or between transparency and mediation, i.e., hid-
den and displayed mediation, and those endless debates around the notion of
realism. These issues arise and begin to dominate because the angle from which
they are approached is a representational one. Without denying the pertinence
of such an angle, we believe that it is not always primordial in the understand-
ing of viewing and listening dispositives. It is thus possible to envisage describ-
ing some aspects of dispositives by only dealing with the relation between spec-
tator and machinery. This is the case, for example, when one isolates a criterion
such as spectator movement or immobility in reception mode. Hence the useful-
ness of the model, which ideally evinces the maximum number of the diverse
aspects that define the dispositives.
One may study the dispositive as a means of determining each relevant level.
One example is machinery, where one will examine the specification of the ma-
chine (if it exists, of course), describe how it works and functions; the type of
support used for the representation must be defined – whether on paper, by
projection, by means of the actor’s body in the theatre, for instance, or by means
of an effigy such as a wax or stone statue or a mannequin. At the spectator level,
the definition of the spectators’ institutional and social position can be exam-
ined – whether they are scientists, game operators or technicians; or their char-
acteristics, in terms of identity, gender or cultural traits. Ultimately, the repre-
sentation will be defined according to its intrinsic functioning and formal traits,
together with their possible combinations.
It should, however, be pointed out that what defines the dispositive is not
only what characterises each of the three levels as such, but the relations that the
dispositive leads to within the three levels it is comprised of. Theoretically, one
can produce the following combinations:
– The relation between the spectator and the machinery;
– The relation between the spectator and the representation;
– The relation between the representation and the machinery;
– The relation between the spectator and the whole – (the machinery and the
representation).
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The idea here is not to present a simple combination of elements of an equiva-
lent type – spectator, representation and machine – but to link together these
three terms in their diverse variations while bearing in mind the purpose of the
viewing and listening dispositives and thus the function that each of the three
terms has in relation to the others:
– The spectators are the element that makes the dispositive function or for
whom the dispositive functions; they are the ones for whom the representa-
tion is given.
– The representation is what the dispositive produces or shows.
– The machinery gives access to the representation and makes possible the
showing (in the widest sense of the term).
Our model analysis of the viewing and listening dispositives is based on these
criteria (highlighting especially the viewing dimension).
Some examples follow below.
1 The relation between the spectators and the machinery
. The relation between spectators’ bodies and the machinery – the question of
places.
a. A lone spectator or group of spectators (magic lantern spectator vs. the
stereoscope).
b. Mobile or immobile spectators (zoetrope, where movement is possible vs.
the dominant model of cinema).
c. Spectators who move.
. The relation between the spectator’s body and the machinery – the question
of size and presentation of the machinery.
a. Spectators included in large-scale machinery (magic lantern, cinema, diora-
ma, panorama).
b. Spectators handling an apparatus, a kind of visual prosthesis (kaleidoscope,
some stereoscopes).
c. The spectator faced with an effect of the mechanism – hidden in a ‘box’ (ki-
netoscope) vs. the spectator faced with a machine in the proper sense of the
word, with a visible mechanism (for example, the praxinoscope).
2 The relation between, on the one hand, the spectators and,
on the other, the machinery and the representation
. What the spectators see of the representation and/or the machinery.
a. They see both levels at once (zoetrope).
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b. They only see the representation (the illusion of transparency, if the techni-
ques of the representation tend to efface the techniques).
c. A borderline case is when they only see the machinery (as in experimental
cinema). This also covers the exhibitions of apparatuses outside their func-
tion as viewing and listening dispositives. They are then integrated into an-
other type of dispositive – that of the exhibition itself, with its multiple mod-
alities. The demonstration of these apparatuses also belongs here.
. The spectators’mode of access to what is seen. The aim here is to define the
point from which one considers that the spectators ‘try out’ the dispositive.
a. Spectators see the two levels successively (one being substituted for the
other) (stereoscope, cinema).
b. Spectators are faced with a progressive process of accommodation: they even-
tually see what is represented after having looked for the point from where it
can indeed be seen (examples include anamorphosis, trompe l’œil, and the
stereoscope).
c. The machinery and what is represented are immediately visible (zoetrope,
phenakistoscope).
. Spectators taking action or remaining inactive in relation to the machinery.
a. Action taken on the machinery to produce the image.
b. ‘Action’ in the form of a simple movement in, or in relation to, the machinery
and representation.
c. No action is taken other than perception.
3 The relation between the spectators and the representation
This part includes questions of cognition – deciphering and decoding visual
signs – and the specification of the spectators’ various systems of beliefs in rela-
tion to the aesthetic choices implied by the ‘techniques’ of the representation.
Theories of representation, which turn representation itself into a ‘proxy’ of real-
ity – or to be more precise, a ‘represented’ and a referent – are relevant here.
4 The relation between the machinery and the representation
. The materialisation of the representation.
a. What is shown (or represented) has no material support in the dispositive
(telescope, microscope).
b. The representation is materialised in one way or another on a support.
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c. The representation relies on a multiple and combined support: it is produced
by elements (actors, objects, painted or photographed elements, etc.) that are
themselves seen via a certain dispositive (theatre, stereoscope).
. The temporal relation of the showing is implied by the dispositive: simulta-
neity/‘différance’.
a. Immediate transmission (immediacy: camera obscura, television, micro-
scope).
b. Deferred broadcasting (time gap: photography, cinema).
5 The overall qualification of the dispositive





– hanging (on a wall)
– ‘installation’.
This model is merely a tool that needs to be rethought, completed or reorga-
nised during the research stage in accordance with each dispositive examined.
The aim is not to build up an exhaustive descriptive model, but to have an ade-
quate tool for each specific set of questions. The outline that we are presenting
here underlines the relations by mainly adopting the spectators as a point of
reference. They may be defined empirically by confronting each dispositive
with the distinctive criteria of the model. In parallel to any theoretical or ab-
stract discourse, one can understand the very concrete role of the different ele-
ments involved – for example, spectators can be seen as spatial bodies occupy-
ing a specific place in relation to the machine or the whole dispositive. Such
spectator characterisation should allow one to reflect on the subject, the receiver
of the representation. It might even uphold Crary’s original theory, when he saw
in the optical instruments of the first half of the nineteenth century the sign of a
new conception of the subject, a new mode of viewing, ‘a subjective vision’
grounded in the ‘observer’s’ own body – she or he is defined as being mobile,
not just having one viewpoint, experimenting with an apprehension of things
that is opposed to the mode of contemplation, as Benjamin put it. This idea goes
hand in hand with the notion of the decentring of the spectator, which Crary
also envisages in relation to these optical instruments (starting from the analysis
of the stereoscope). An essential aspect must be added to this definition: the
classifying of these dispositives within all of the coercive modes of viewing, im-
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plying submission to the machinery that is comparable to the panopticon ana-
lysed by Michel Foucault.
However, a concrete approach to dispositives – when one tries to characterise
them in finer detail by combining several descriptive criteria – leads to ques-
tions about how in tune they are with the definition that Crary borrows from
Foucault and above all Benjamin. The zoetrope, phenakistoscope, thaumatrope,
diorama, stereoscope, and kaleidoscope are examined to show how they contri-
bute to the changing of the mode of viewing. Some of these apparatuses share
the characteristic of making spectators an element of the machine, which sub-
mits their bodies to a practice of viewing, but also of constructing a new model
of the spectator as someone who is mobile, decentred, etc. However, if one re-
examines the criterion of mobility, it is clear that the spectator’s experience in
relation to these different dispositives is not the same: while the phenakisto-
scope requires the spectator not to move, as Crary points out – as does the
stereoscope – the zoetrope allows her or him to move around the rotating me-
chanism at the very moment when it is producing the animated representation.
While retinal persistence is the model that explains the represented movement –
a model that was used in the nineteenth century in connection with Plateau’s
experiments for several of these viewing dispositives – it cannot hide the funda-
mental difference that sets them apart. The fact that some are based on mobil-
ity and others on fixedness is all the more significant as the essential criterion of
modernity is precisely the mobility of the point of view. The spectator’s experi-
ence is shaped in a significantly more meaningful way by the concrete move-
ment imposed on the body by one or other dispositive than by the perceptive
(and not immediately analysed) ‘movement’ that is attributed to retinal persis-
tence. When one wishes to define the subject in relation to her or his experience,
the analysis of scientific discourses and theories is no substitute for the concrete
phenomenon imposed by the dispositive in its materiality.
A further point should also be added, which our model incorporates: free-
dom of movement is not the same in the zoetrope, thaumatrope and diorama,
and this is the result of a significant difference. In some cases, the apparatus is a
tool that remains outside the spectators’ bodies – at best it is a prosthesis that is
applied to the eyes (like the kaleidoscope or some ‘stereoscope-glasses’), which
they can thus handle at will; in other cases, spectators are included in a disposi-
tive that incorporates them – that is, when one refers to spectators as ‘elements
of a machine’. The nature of the movement and the physical and phenomenolo-
gical relation of the spectator to the dispositive are very different each time, and
one may well ask if this does not completely change the ascendancy of the dis-
positive, its supposed coercion. To put it very bluntly: in order to introduce the
model that Foucault bases on the panopticon, is it sufficient to retain the fact that
the subjects are manipulated by a certain politics of the body? Is it not necessary
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to envisage the very structure of the dispositive in order to postulate the effect
of control produced by machineries that are simply not defined institutionally
as instruments intended for such a function?
It is hard systematically to pinpoint the known and already established cri-
teria of modernity in dispositives, given that one might refute such criteria after
examining the dispositives closely.
A good example is the stereoscope, an apparatus that imposes fixedness.
Here the new subject of viewing is constructed thanks to the decentring of the
spectator, which can be demonstrated via an analysis of the representation that
the stereoscope offers. But as we are speaking of the spectator’s ‘experience’,
should one not also take into account all the dispositive, the very condition of
the spectator’s perception, even before one addresses the issue of representa-
tion? For when it comes to perception, the stereoscope imposes the centring of
the spectator, on the one hand with regard to the fixedness of her or his place in
front of the lenses, without moving, and on the other hand in the need to ac-
commodate her or his viewing to the only point where it will be possible to see
the ‘depth’ of the objects presented. This type of experience requires a certain
type of centring, even if this is not defined according to the codes of perspective.
The analysis of the discourses on which an epistemological approach is based
must proceed by gauging the theoretical development against the concrete di-
mension of the object of these discourses, specifically when the aim is to devel-
op an understanding of the subject that has been constructed as a body sub-
mitted to an experience. One cannot turn a blind eye to the actual conditions of
this experience and their plural nature, in order to weigh them against the theo-
retical discourses that surround them in a particular context.
The model represents a means to avoid an apprehension of a dispositive that
would be too rapid, too partial and not sufficiently concrete in the design of a
theoretical, epistemological and thus a fortiori conceptual discourse. It is thus a
kind of safeguard. But, more positively speaking, it should provide a means of
displacing and renewing the problematics that question the viewing and listen-
ing dispositives, while exploiting the largest number of terms that can be used
to set up the epistemic schema of the ‘cinema’ in c. .
Notes
. This article is a rewritten, developed and modified version of the paper presented at
the Domitor Symposium (Montreal), with a number of corrections and additions.
Some of the publications that present these ideas can be found in the bibliography.
. The French etymology of ‘montage’ comes from the clock whose weights must be
wound up (monter), is said to be wound up (montée), and metaphorically speaking,
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in French one uses the verb remonter when one speaks of winding (up) the clock’s
successor – the watch. François Dagognet has addressed the place of the ‘clock mod-
el’ in the history of techniques, in his l’Essor technologique et l’idée de progrès, Paris:
Armand Colin, , pp. -. Regarding the extension of automata, see Jean-
Claude Beaune, l’Automate et ses mobiles, Paris: Flammarion, .
. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chica-
go Press, .
. Pierre Francastel has underlined Brunelleschi’s use of an optical instrument several
times as ‘a kind of little box’with a hole for the eye and a mirror reflecting a view of
Florence, or Poussin’s manipulation of a scenographic box which he used to study
the effects of light on the people he painted (see ‘Destruction d’un espace plastique’,
in Etudes de sociologie de l’art, Paris: Denoël/Gonthier, ‘Médiations’, ).
. Regarding the multiplication of viewpoints and their montage in El Greco’s work,
see S. Eisenstein, ‘El Greco y el cine’, in Cinématisme, Dijon: Les Presses du Réel, 
[]), passim. On Canaletto and his ‘montaged’ Venice, see André Corboz, Venezia
immaginaria, Milan: Electa, ,  volumes.
. See Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, Palo Alto: Stanford University
Press,  [] and Jonathan Crary, l’Art de l’observateur, Nîmes: Jacqueline
Chambon,  [].
. Giorgio Agamben, Qu’est-ce qu’un dispositif?, Paris: Rivages-Poche, , p. . One
could add that, more recently, we have not been convinced by the ‘philosophy’ of
the apparatus as espoused by Jean-Louis Déotte, where perspective with a unique
vanishing point is considered to be ‘apparatus’ that forms ‘the base of modernity’.
He also speculates on the move from the technical apparatus to the aesthetic and
then the cultural apparatus (see in particular: J.-L. Déotte, l’Epoque des appareils,
Paris: Lignes & Manifestes, ).
. Philippe Hamon, Expositions, littérature et architecture au XIXe siècle, Paris: José Corti,
.
. F. Fénéon, ‘“Calendrier de décembre ”, Cirques, Théâtres, Politiques’, Œuvres
plus que complètes, Geneva: Droz, Tome II, p. -.
. P. Verhaeren, Mercure de France, October , reprinted in Sensations d’art, Paris:
Séguier, , p. . The relation between impressionist painting and photography
is thus very different from what Bazin describes in his ‘Ontologie de l’image photo-
graphique’, where photography ‘delivers’ painting and allows it to gain its ‘aes-
thetic autonomy’ (Qu’est-ce que le cinéma ?, Paris: Cerf, , pp. -) – a position
that was popularised by Malraux in his writings on art in the s.
. Henry d’Audigier, la Patrie,  July  (quoted in Sylvie Aubenas (ed.), Gustave Le
Gray (-), Paris: BNF-Gallimard, , pp. -). Cézanne’s comments, as
noted by Joachim Gasquet in front of one of Courbet’s ‘Waves’, are similar in their
intention.
. Gustave Le Gray, Traité pratique de photographie sur papier et sur verre, Paris: Baillère,
 (at: gallica.bnf.fr)).
. Regarding several of the points briefly raised here about Le Gray, see Sylvie Aube-
nas (ed.), op. cit. This ‘colourism’ of the photograph stands in opposition to the
photography criticism of such scholars as Rodolphe Töpffer, who contrasts it with
the greater efficiency of drawing.
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. See his Salons, which were compared to paintings in the exhibition entitled ‘Diderot
et l’Art, de Boucher à David. Les Salons -’ (Hôtel de la Monnaie (Paris), Oc-
tober -January ).
. This is an important question and should stimulate anew the question of the effect
‘breaking out’ has on the spectators of the La Ciotat train in the Lumière brothers’
film. Yuri Tsivian, when distinguishing between reception and perception, thought
that the reception of The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat in Russia was, as it were, ‘over-
determined’ for cultivated spectators by the description of Anna Karenina’s suicide
in Tolstoy’s novel. (See the fourth chapter of his Istoriceskaja recepcia kino. Kinemato-
graf v Rossii - [Riga, ], and the sixth chapter of the English translation,
Early Cinema and its Cultural Reception, translated by Alan Bodger, London and New
York: Routledge, , ‘The Reception of the Moving Image’). It could also be said
that the Parisian or French spectators received the same film via a passage from
Maupassant’s novel Une Vie (AWoman’s Life), or, in any case, patterns of comprehen-
sion that are common to the text and the film. One can clearly see that Maupassant’s
description recounts all the phases of the film, and one can thus conjecture that the
effect of surprise, or even of panic, that often allegedly took place when the train left
the foreground of the screen encountered conceptual frameworks in the spectators’
brains that were perfectly well established, and was thus received and understood
without surprise: ‘Nothing was visible on the track. Suddenly she saw a cloud of
white smoke, then under it a black spot, which grew larger as it approached at full
speed. At last the huge engine, slowing up, roared past Jeanne; she kept her eyes on
the carriage doors. Several of them opened and passengers got out, peasants in their
blouses, farmers’ wives with baskets, small shopkeepers in soft felt hats.’ (Guy de
Maupassant, Une Vie, Paris, Le Livre de Poche no. , ; A Woman’s Life, trans-
lated, with an introduction by H.N.P. Sloman, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books,
, p. ).
However, the ‘same’ movement from the rear to the front against a black back-
ground – as Méliès portrays in his Man with a Rubber Head – takes on a different
meaning: if the train gets larger as it approaches, the spatial distance represented
(set up by expectation, a fortiori, if one begins by projecting the stationary image of
the perspective of the rails disappearing into the distance) allows one to assume a
permanence in the size of the moving object and to be assured of its movement right
up to the moment when it leaves the frame. On the contrary, Méliès’s movement on
a bench facing a camera loses its characteristics of movement, since there are no
points of spatial reference, and simply appears to change size. In this case, the mag-
nifying effect borders on the monstrous or on anomaly, and may give rise to fear
(fear of the head bursting, which then actually happens). The bursting takes place
inside the frame, whereas the arrival ‘in the hall’ that the train is supposed to accom-
plish has to happen off-camera. Tsivian, following Arnheim on this point, notes that
as the figure approaches, it spreads across the surface of the screen. And this is what
happens to Méliès in excess. Similarly, the wave – if indeed one can compare it to
the train – clearly gets its force and the effect of reality from the dual presence of the
two aspects of the landscape. And it is the fact of its breaking away that produces the
effect of breaking out.
. One of his ‘Waves’ is special, in that there is an extremely sharp horizon line,
against which three elements are juxtaposed: ) the sky unfolding with very de-
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tailed clouds; ) a rough sea with high, foamy waves; and ) a strip of land with two
moored boats, creating an effect of verticalization of two-thirds of the painting (the
sky and the sea), which the perception of the land redistributes in depth because of
its initiating place in the foreground and its brownish tonality, which stands out
against the whiteness of the foam.
. Our starting point is Michel Foucault’s definition in l’Archéologie du savoir (Paris:
Gallimard, ; Archeology of Knowledge, English translation by Alan M. Sheridan
Smith, London and New York: Routledge, , p. ): ‘By episteme, we mean, in
fact, the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices
that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized sys-
tems… The episteme is not a form of knowledge (connaissance) or type of rationality
which, crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifest the sovereign
unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can be dis-
covered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the
level of discursive regularities.’
. Henri Bergson, Matière et mémoire, , p. , p. ; Matter and Memory, translated
by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, London: George Allen and Unwin,
, p. , p. .
. Guillaume Apollinaire, ‘le Roi-Lune’, Mercure de France, no. ,  October ,
pp. -.
. We are thinking here of scholars such as Crary (who, without warning, presents
representational criteria while giving them a meaning that needs to be debated –
his use of the notion of ‘referent’ in particular) or Kittler, who assumes the Lacanian
approach – but one could also mention Deleuze’s Bergsonism (only Alain Badiou
has espoused the idea that Cinema  and  were in no way books ‘on’ the cinema –
or, as Deleuze said, ‘of’ the cinema – but a reading of Bergson that was intended to
bring him up to date and find a way round the prodigious phenomenologist obsta-
cle – See his Deleuze, Paris: Hachette, ).
. The diorama, phenakistoscope and zoetrope are specifically cited (op. cit., p.).
. Leaving aside the fact that, for several decades, its importance has been relativised
on the basis of the experimental research of psychologists (including those working
at the Institut de Filmologie [-]).
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